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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS MAUGHAN, : REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs : Case No. 870589-CA 
PAULETTE LaDAWN NORMAN MAUGHAN, 
Defendant/Respondent : Priority No. 7 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues are outlined in plaintiff's and defendant's 
briefs• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
plaintiff reaffirms the statement of facts as set forth in 
plaintiff's initial brief and concurs with defendant's statement 
of facts except as follows, and with additional facts as stated 
herein: 
1. While defendant moved a total of twelve (12) times 
following her divorce from plaintiff, she held only four (4) jobs 
1 
and was fired from her position in Salt Lake City for failing to 
report regularly for work. The record reflects that only four of 
the twelve moves were associated with either employment or 
school. (TR pp. 9-13) 
2. Defendant acknowledged that she had gone "bar hopping" 
almost every weekend for a period of 8 months and on occasion has 
gone home with different males (TR pp.30-32). 
3. Defendant acknowledged sexual relationships with eight 
different men following her divorce. She admitted that a couple 
of men had stayed with her at the Kearns apartment that she 
rented from Bill Peck. Mr. Peck testified that four or five 
different men had stayed overnight at the apartment which he 
rented to defendant, including one who was there the last month 
almost every night and several times during the week. Defendant 
also acknowledged to Jannette Maughan that other men had stayed 
at the apartment she rented from Mr. Peck. She admitted that 
her son, Riley, was gone less than half of the time during the 
months when she would have men over (TR pp.35, 382, 243, 183 and 
368) . 
4. Defendant did expose herself improperly to her children 
and engage in sexual acts or inappropriate sexual conduct in 
2 
front of the children (TR pp.165-166, 192, 403). 
5. That when defendant moved from the apartment she rented 
in Logan, both her landlady, Anita Perry, and her next door 
neighbor, Sandi Krebs, observed excrement smeared on the walls of 
the upstairs bedroom. Further, defendant admitted to Jannette 
Maughan a few weeks prior to trial on the modification issue, 
that Riley had pooped in the heat vent upstairs in his brother's 
bedroom (TR pp.66,81, and 224). That testimony is unrefuted by 
defendant. The fact that the trial court did not mention the 
excrements specifically in its findings does not change the 
undisputed nature of that testimony. 
6. Defendant advised her next door neighbor, Sandi Krebs, 
that she had had an abortion in the spring 1986. .Nothing was 
said by defendant about having a miscarriage or a D&C (TR p.75). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I . T h e i n c r e a s e i n c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y a b l e f r o m 
p l a i n t i f f t o d e f e n d a n t f rom $75 t o $ 1 5 0 p e r m o n t h made by t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t c o n s t i t u t e d e r r o r a n d a b u s e o f i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n 
l i g h t o f p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t u a l i n c o m e . 
A. D e f e n d a n t ' s a rgument t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s g r o s s income from 
t h e S t a t e o f U t a h Highway D e p a r t m e n t o f $ 1 2 4 0 j u s t i f i e s t h e 
i n c r e a s e i n c h i l d s u p p o r t t o $150 p e r m o n t h , d i s r e g a r d s t h e 
p r o j e c t e d o f f - s e t t i n g l o s s w h i c h p l a i n t i f f a n t i c i p a t e d on h i s 
farm o p e r a t i o n . 
B. The a c t u a l l o s s a s r e f l e c t e d on p l a i n t i f f ' s 1987 f e d e r a l 
income t a x r e t u r n , c o n f i r m s an even g r e a t e r l o s s and v e r i f i e s t h e 
e r r o r made by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . 
P O I N T I I . T h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d i s t h e 
o v e r a r c h i n g p r i n c i p l e i n a l l c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . 
POINT I I I . P l a i n t i f f ' s a p p e a l i s n o t f r i v o l o u s and h a s n o t 
been a s s e r t e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d e l a y , t h e r e f o r e , no c o s t s 
a t t o r n e y f e e s shou ld be awarded t o d e f e n d a n t . 
A. P l a i n t i f f ' s a p p e a l h a s been a s s e r t e d i n good f a i t h and 
u p o n t h e r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y 
p r e p o n d e r a t e d a g a i n s t t h e f i n d i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h a t 
4 
said trial court abused its discretion in failing to modify the 
Decree of Divorce and award custody to plaintiff. 
B. The cases of PORCO v PORCO and BRIGHAM CITY v MANTUA 
TOWN are clearly distinct from and do not apply to the facts of 
the subject appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT PAYABLE FROM PLAINTIFF TO 
DEFENDANT FROM $75 TO $150 PER MONTH MADE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT CONSTITUTED ERROR AND ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION 
IN LIGHT OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTUAL INCOME. 
Plaintiff's initial brief reflected an estimated loss of 
between $1,000 and $2,000 which he projected from his farm 
operation in 1987. (See plaintiff's bri£f p.37 hereinafter 
referred to as P's BR. p.37). However, plaintiff's 1987 return,-
which was not available at the time plaintiff's initial brief was 
filed, verifies an actual loss in his farming operation of 
approximately $4500, after adjustment for a capital gain 
resulting from the sale of some cows (See Addendum, copy of 1987 
federal income tax return, Tab 1) 
Plaintiff's gross income for 1987 was $10,111. This 
represents a monthly income of approximately $843 and is roughly 
the same or even less than it was when the parties divorced in 
1983. (P's BR. p.36) Clearly, no substantial and material change 
of economic circumstance has occurred since the divorce of the 
parties in 1983 which would justify the trial court doubling the 
amount of child support owed defendant by plaintiff from $75 to 
$15 0 per month. Such action constituted an abuse of discretion 
6 
and should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IS THE OVERARCHING 
PRINCIPLE IN ALL CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS. 
Defendant's contention in her Statement of Issues Presented 
on Appeal (Defendant's brief p.3, hereinafter referred to as D's 
BR p.3)# that since the trial court did not find a substantial 
and material change of circumstances had occurred, the best 
interests of the child should not be considered by this court on 
the issue of custody, is seriously flawed. I 
Defendant's position that the best interests of the child 
should not be considered by this court completely ignores the 
serious concerns and grave reservations, expressed by a majority 
of the court, as reflected in their concurring opinions in KRAMER 
v KRAMER, 738 P.2d 624 (Utah 1987). Their concern was that trial 
courts not focus too rigidly on the first prong of HOGGE ie. 
whether or not a substantial change of circumstances has 
occurred, and thereby lose sight of and not follow the 
overarching principle in all custody determinations ie. the best 
interests of the child (See P's BR pp.26-29)| 
The trial court failed to consider changes in the 
circumstances of the non-custodial parent as well as the best 
7 
interests of the minor child, Riley Maughan, and thereby abused 
its discretion. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS AND HAS NOT 
BEEN ASSERTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELAY; THEREFORE, 
NO COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO 
DEFENDANT• 
A. Plaintiff's appeal has been asserted in good 
faith and upon the reasonable and prudent belief 
that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the trial court and that 
said trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to modify the Decree of Divorce and 
award custody to plaintiff. 
The position asserted by defendant that plaintiff's appeal 
is frivolous, without any merit, and has no reasonable likelihood 
of prevailing, is presumptuous and without merit. 
It is submitted that the decision of the trial court in 
failing to reopen the question of custody and consider the best 
interests of the child should be overturned in that (1) the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, (2) the trial 
court abused its discretion and (3) the trial court misapplied 
the law^ GILL v GILL, 718 P. 2d 7 79,780. It is submitted that 
the decision of the trial court, in the subject case, should be 
overturned on all three grounds. 
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FREQUENT MOVES, In an attempt to justify the decision of 
the trial court that no substantial or material change of 
circumstances had occurred, defendant's counsel asserts, without 
support in the record, that the 12 residential moves made in the 
four years following the divorce of the parties, occurred 
primarily to allow defendant to improve her job training and job 
skills and obtain adequate employment (D's BR pp. 14-15). 
However, it is clear that four different jobs were involved in 
the twelve residential changes and that defendant was fired from 
her position in Salt Lake City as a secretary for not coming to 
work (TR pp.12-13). There is not one whit of evidence in the 
record supporting defendant's allegation that she lived in three 
different apartments in Logan, each being an attempt to improve 
her situation. 
By contrast, the concerns enumerated by the family 
therapist, Dr. Hill, regarding changes in adult nurturing 
authority due to moves or job changes and the adverse and 
unbalancing impact it has upon children was very clear. His 
emphasis that past behavior is the best predictor of future 
behavior and conclusion that plaintiff's home presented a more 
stable environment than did defendant's, is likewise important. 
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Finally, the circumstances of this case go well beyond the 
MITCHELL case, 668 P.2d 561 (Utah 1983) wherein our Supreme Court 
held that two residence changes by the custodial parent and one 
child becoming very attached to the non-custodial parent, were 
sufficient and material changes in circumstances to warrant the 
change of custody granted. In the case at hand, there were not 
two residence changes but twelve. Further, an extremely close 
relationship developed between the child, Riley Maughan, and 
plaintiff and a somewhat distant relationship from defendant (See 
to P's BR pp.12-14)1 This evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings of the trial court. 
SUPERVISION OF CHILDREN. Defendant commented in her brief 
that the court noted that her witnesses had indicated that 
proper supervision and control of the children (D's BR p.16). 
This conclusion is clearly and overwhelmingly refuted by the 
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses. In contrast to the 
observations of defendant's witnesses, several of whom had only 
become involved since the hearing of July 27, 1987, when 
temporary custody of the children was placed with Bear River 
Social Services, plaintiff's witnesses had had some ongoing and 
regular contact with defendant and had observed on a regular 
basis, defendant's lack of supervision and control. The evidence 
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clearly preponderates against the finding by the trial court that 
there was adequate control and supervision of the minor child, 
Riley Maughan, by defendant (See P's BR pp.14-19). 
ALLEGED SEXUAL CONDUCT. Defendant cites the case of 
FONTENOT v FONTENOT, 714 P. 2d 1131 (Utah 1986) to justify her 
various sexual liaisons as not adversely affecting her parenting 
abilities nor adversely affecting the child. While FONTENOT 
stands for the proposition that a custodial parent's extra-
marital relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to justify 
a change of custody, this case is very distinct. 
In FONTENOT there was no evidence the children had been 
directly exposed to or affected by the mother's sexual behavior. 
Also, the non-custodial parent had presented no evidence which 
would support such a finding. However, in the case at hand, 
there is clear evidence that the children were exposed to 
inappropriate sexual behavior by defendant and her boyfriend, 
Jack Alley. The minor child, Riley Maughan, confided to his baby 
sitter, Barbara Dalton, on two separate occasions, and the 
information was immediately repeated to plaintiff and his present 
wife, that he had seen his mother, defendant, and her boyfriend 
naked in front of him and they made him look at certain: parts of 
their bodies (penis and pubic areas). He also said that he had 
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seen them naked in bed together which is consistent with 
defendant's admission to the family therapist, Dr. Hill, that 
Riley had walked into their bedroom at night while she was making 
IcwewLthJ^ ckALl^ . (P'sERp.21). Thechildalso stated that Jack Alley had 
touched him, and had bit him on his penis, and had "peed" on him, 
which was a reference, that in the opinion of Dr. Hill, referred 
to the ejaculation process. (TR p. 129-130). The stepmother, 
Jannette Maughan, testified that a neighbor told her that he 
overheard defendant's oldest son, Cody, age 6, tell a playmate of 
sex acts that he had seen defendant and Jack Alley perform. 
While defendant denied that she was aware of any sexual 
abuse by Jack Alley toward her son, Riley Maughan, her proclivity 
to sexually entertain various men at her home where her children 
are present,sets up the very circumstances that lend themselves 
to sexual abuse such as occurred in this case. Defendant's 
casual attitude that it was no concern of plaintiff who she 
sleeps with or how many she sleeps with,is reflective of an 
atmosphere which breeds the potential for sex abuse. It also was 
noted by the landlord, Bill Peck, in whose home defendant lived 
for a period of six months, that he was deeply concerned about 
the various men she had over and the poor moral example it set 
for not only her children, but his as well. (See P'S BR pp. 19-
12 
25). The evidence clearly preoonderates against the trial 
court's finding that defendant's promiscuous conduct had no 
impact or effect upon the child. A very poor moral atmostphere 
and example were set for Riley by defendant. 
Defendant's assertion at the time of trial, that plaintiff 
was the father of her son, Josh, who was born out of wedlock 2 
1/2 years after her divorce from plaintiff, was adamantly denied 
by plaintiff (See P's BR p.20). A recent report of the 
University of Utah Medical Center, dated June 21, 1988, has 
definitely excluded plaintiff as the father of defendant's son, 
Josh, who was Dorn out of wedlock on January 13, 1985. 
Defendant's veracity and credibility is placed in serious doubt. 
(See Addendum, Paternity Test, Tab 2). 
IMPACT OF KRAMER DECISION. The trial court has misread and 
misapplied the law as set forth in KRAMER. It is important and 
significant to note that the court's opinion, authored by Justice 
Zimmerman, was joined in only by Justice Durham, (emphasis 
supplied). Thus, it represents a consensus of a minority of the 
court i.e. two of the five justices as to the opinion itself. 
The result reached by the court in that case, on its particular 
facts was concurred in by the other three justices, (emphasis 
supplied). The alleged changes of circumstances, involving the 
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custodial parent in KRAMER were somewhat mild in that, unlike 
this case there were in KRAMER, no sexual liaisons with eight 
different men, no frequent moves and job changes and no lack of 
supervision and no sexual abuse of the child by the custodial 
parent's boyfriend. In KRAMER, Chief Justice Hall, Associate 
Chief Justice Stewart and Justice Howe, constituting a majority 
of the court, expressed serious reservations about many of the 
things mentioned in Justice Zimmerman's opinion, namely, the too-
rigid focus only on the change of circumstances on the part of 
the custodial parent and failing to deal with the overarching 
principle which itself promotes stability i.e. the need to ensure 
that custody awards are in the best interests of the children 
involved. 
The majority of the court, held in KRAMER, as reflected in 
their concurring opinions, that the trial court should not turn a 
deaf ear to changes in the life of a non-custodial parent and, 
thereby, forever lock the child into spending the rest of his or 
her minority in an inferior environment. They also emphasize 
that no benefit will result from preserving stability in a 
parent-child relationship that is destructive, especially when 
another parent might have a positive influence on a child. 
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The trial court clearly misapplied the law and thereby 
abused its discretion in failing to take into account the turn 
around which had occurred in the life of plaintiff. His stable 
and happy present marriage, the positive spiritual and moral 
atmosphere provided by plaintiff and his present wife for the 
child, the excellent home and a very loving relationshipi all 
reflect the very concerns mentioned by Associate Chief Justice 
Stewart in KRAMER and concurred in by Justices Howe and Chief 
Justice Hall. 
B. The cases of PORCO v PORCO and BRIGHAM CITY v 
MANUTA TOWN are clearly distinct from and do not apply to the 
facts of the subject appeal. 
In PORCO v PORCO, Utah Advance Reports 35(Ut. Court of 
Appeals 1988), the plaintiff had unsuccessfully attempted to 
terminate or modify alimony payments four times between 1980 and 
1984. He had previously refused to pay alimony which resulted in 
several judgments and garnishment proceedings taken against him. 
The court correctly concluded in that matter that his repeated 
litigation tactics constituted attempts to punish defendant 
despite his rebuff on five prior occasions by the trial court and 
the accompanying lack of merit to his claim. In PORCO, the 
plaintiff also attempted to overturn an award of attorney fees 
15 
four years after the fact. He had not appealed the award 
initially. 
By contrast in the instant case, there has been a single 
appeal of the modification action. That appeal is based, in 
part, upon the very strong language of a majority of the court in 
KRAMER, as expressed in the opinions concurring in the result in 
that particular case, based upon its own facts, but disagreeing 
with the too-rigid focus upon a change of circumstances by only 
the custodial parent and failing to properly take into account 
the overarching principle of the best interests of the child. 
In addition, it is submitted that the evidence in this case, 
which is the subject of this appeal, clearly preponderates 
against the findings made by the trial court. It is further 
submitted that the trial court misapplied the law, namely, the 
KRAMER decision by failing to consider the circumstances of the 
non-custodial parent and the best interest of the child as well 
as the decided weight of the evidence, that, in fact, a 
substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred, 
warranting re-opening of the custody question. To assert that 
such a claim is frivolous, is not only presumptuous on the part 
of defendant, but would indeed have a chilling effect on the 
right to appeal those decisions which are reasonably and 
prudently believed to be erroneous. 
The case of BRIGHAM CITY v MAUNTA TOWN is likewise clearly 
16 
distinct. In that case the court concluded that there was no 
conceivable legal or factual basis upon which the Town of Manuta 
could reasonably expect to prevail. They also ruled that the 
appeal was taken for the purpose of delay. 
Defendant's contention that the subject appeal resulted in 
delay implementation of the judgment of the lower court, 
increased the costs of litigation, and dissipation of the time 
and resources of the law court, conveniently overlooks the fact 
that the motion filed by plaintiff following the decision of the 
trial court, to stay judgment pending appeal, was not opposed by 
defendant and was, upon the expiration of 10 days notice, granted 
by the trial court. (See Addendum, Order Staying Judgment, Tab 
3) 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence presented by 
plaintiff clearly preponderate against the findings of the trial 
court. The various witnesses called by plaintiff represented a 
cross section of individuals who observed frequently, and for 
substantial periods of time, the parenting skills of defendant. 
By contrast, defendant's witnesses were persons with either self-
serving motives, or had very limited contact with defendant 
17 
or whose contacts with defendant were limited to the time 
following the court hearing of July 27, 1987, placing temporary 
custody of the minor children of defendant with Bear River Social 
Services. 
The minor child. Riley Maughan, as well as his six year old 
brother, Cody, observed inappropriate sexual conduct by defendant 
which Riley related to his baby sitter, Barbara Dalton, who 
immediately in turn repeated it to plaintiff and his present 
wife. His brother, Cody, repeated to a playmate having observed 
his mother, defendant, and her boyfriend, Jack Alley, engaged in 
sexual acts, which occurrence was repeated by a neighbor to 
plaintiff's wife. The family therapist, Dr. Hill, testified 
that, in his opinion, such statements would be true unless there 
was some reason for the babysitter to fantasize of which there 
was no evidence. The proclivity of defendant to entertain 
various men sexually lends itself to a circumstance of sexual 
abuse which, it is submitted, did occur between the minor child 
and defendants boyfriend. Further, defendant's comments that 
she would continue to entertain whichever men she desired, 
whenever she desired, and that is was none of plaintiff's 
business, suggests no desire to modify her lifestyle. Said 
promiscuous conduct by the defendant has had an adverse impact 
18 
upon the minor child, Riley Maughan. 
The trial court has misapplied the law as reflected in the 
KRAMER decision. It has failed to take into appropriate account, 
the concurring opinions of a majority of the court. Those 
opinions emphasize serious concerns and reservations regarding 
the opinion of Justice Zimmerman, ie. that the court should only 
look at changes in the circumstances of the custodial parent and 
not consider the circumstances of the non-custodial parent. A 
majority of the court, the their concurring opinions, confirmed 
the overarching principle that must be considered in all custody 
cases, ie. the best interests of the children themselves. They 
emphasized that children need to be able to find appropriate role 
models after which to pattern their lives and that no good can 
come from preserving stability in parent-child relationships that 
are destructive, especially when another parent might have a 
positive influence on the child, (emphasis supplied). 
The subject appeal is not frivolous, but in fact, is based 
upon a reasonable and prudent belief that the trial court abused 
its discretion in that the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings of the trial court and that the law as reflected in 
KRAMER has been misapplied. Accordingly, neither double costs 
nor attorney fees are warranted insofar as the defendant is 
concerned. 
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As previously noted in plaintiff's brief, the award of 
attorney fees by the trial court constituted error and abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed. Further, in light of the 
evidence regarding plaintiff's actual 1987 income, coupled with 
the fact there has not been a substantial and material change in 
plaintiff's economic circumstances to warrant the increase in 
child support ordered by the trial court, that judgment should be 
set aside. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the 
decision of the trial court should be reversed and custody of the 
minor child, Riley Maughan, awarded to plaintiff, together with a 
reasonable sum as and for child support and plaintiff should be 
awarded his costs incurred herein. 
Respectfully submitted this /$ day of August, 1988. 
TIM W. HEALY ^ ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g Reply 
B r i e f t o S t e p h e n W. J e w e l l , A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f , F i r s t 
S e c u r i t y Bank B l d g . , Logan, UT 84321 on t h i s / f day of A u g u s t , 
1 9 8 8 . 
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ADDENDUM 
TAB 1. Plaintiff's 1987 Income Tax return. 
TAB 2. University of Utah Medical Center Paternity Test. 
TAB 3. Order Staying Judgment. 
22 
1040 Department of the Treasury—Internal Revenue Service U.S. Individual Income Tax Return H®87 
For the year Jan.-Dec. 3 1 , 1987, or other tax year beginning , 1987, ending .19 OMB No 1545-0074 
Use 
IRS 
label. 
Other-
wise, 
please 
print 
or type. 
THOMAS G. !< JANNETTE B. MAUBHAN 
62 NORTH 200 EAST 
WELLBVILLE, UT 84339 
Your social security number 
528-04-4608 
Spouse's social security number 
532-80 -2490 
For Privacy Act and Paperwork Re-
duction Act Notice, see Instructions, 
Presidential 
Election Campaign • 
Do you want $ 1 to go to this fund? . . . 
If joint return, does your spouse want $ 1 to go to this fund?. 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Note: Checking "Yes" will 
not change your tax or 
reduce your refund. 
Filing Status 
Check only 
one box. 
Single 
Married filing joint return (even if only one had income) 
Married filing separate return. Enter spouse's social security no. above and full name here. 
Head of household. If qualifying person is your child but not your dependent, enter child's name here. 
Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child (year spouse died • 19 ). (See page 7 of Instructions.) 
Exemptions 
(See 
Instructions 
on page 7.) 
If more than 7 
dependents, see 
Instructions on 
page 7. 
6a Yourself 6b Spouse 
c Dependents 
(1) Name (first, initial, and last name) 
KLIFFARD 
RILEY 
(2) Chech 
if under 
age 5 
X 
X 
(3) If age 5 or over, dependent's 
social security number 
(4) Relationship 
SON 
SON 
|5| No ot 1 
months lived j 
In vow homo 1 
m 1987 
12 
12 
d If your child didn't live with you but is claimed as your dependent under a pre-1985 agreement, check here. 
e Total number of exemptions claimed (also complete line 3 5 ) . . . . . . , . . . . 
m 
No of boxes 
checked on 6a 
and 6b • 
No of children 
on 6c who lived ^ 
with you 
No. of children 
on 6c who didn't 
live with you due 
to divorce or >> 
separation 
No of parents 
listed on 6c • 
No. of other 
dependents ^ 
listed on 6c w 
Add numbers 
entered in 
boxes above • 
_2_ 
1 
7 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. (attach Form(s) W-2) 
Income 
Plelse attach 
Copy B of your 
Forms W-2, W-2G, 
and W-2P here. 
If you do not have 
a W-2, see 
f»age 6 of nstructions. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Taxable interest income (also attach Schedule B if over $400) 
Tax-exempt interest income (see page 10). DON'T include on line 8 
Dividend income (also attach Schedule B if over $400) . . . 
Taxable refunds of state and local income taxes, if any, from worksheet on page 11 of Instructions. 
Alimony received 
Business income or (loss) (attach Schedule C) 
h 
*ase 
Jach check 
or money 
order here. 
Capital gain or (loss) (attach Schedule D) 
Other gains or (losses) (attach Forj&4 
1 6 a Pensions, IRA distributions, annuiti 
b Taxable amount (see page 1 1 ) . 
1 7 Rents, royalties, partnerships, estl 
1 8 Farm income or (loss) (attach Schedule F) . . . . 
1 9 Unemployment compensation ( i n s u r a n c e ) . . . . 
2 0 a Social security benefits (see page 12) . . . . . 
b Taxable amount, if any, f rom the worksheet on page 12 
2 1 Other income 
r\Ttt 
ittach Schedule E) . 
20aJ 
2 2 Add the amounts shown in the far right column for lines 7, 8, and 1 0 - 2 1 . This is your total Income 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
m 
16b 
17 
18 
19 
m 20b 
21 
22 
14,670, 
4,468, 
-9,027, 
10, Hi 
Adjustments 
to Income 
(See 
Instructions 
on page 12.) 
23 Reimbursed employee business expenses from Form 2106 . . 
24a Your IRA deduction, from applicable worksheet on page 13 or 14 
b Spouse's IRA deduction, from applicable worksheet on page 13 or 14 . . . 
25 Self-employed health insurance deduction, from worksheet on page 14 . 
26 Keogh retirement plan and self-employed SEP deduction. . . 
27 Penalty on early withdrawal of savings 
28 Alimony paid ( f , e 3 c f f n t ' s 
and social security no. 
-). 
23 
24a 
24b 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 Add lines 23 through 28. These are your total adjustments . 
Adj , Gr. I n c o m e 30 Subtract line 29 from line 22. This is your adjusted gross Income, 
H733 
• 30 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 
10401 NTF 7973 Preparers Edition 
ORIGINAL FILE WITH IRS 
form 1040(1987) Page 2 
Tax 
Compu-
tation 
Caution: « 
If you 
checked any 
bot on line 
32a. b .ore 
and you 
do* t 
*t*mtze, see 
?*$* 16 for 
t*# amount 
1o*nfer on 
fen* 33b. 
3 1 
32a 
b 
c 
33a 
- b 
34 
35 
36 
Amount from line 30 (adjusted gross Income) 
Check if: j |You were 65 or over L J B I i n d ; I 1 Spouse was 65 or over | [Blind. 
Add the number of boxes checked and enter the total here. . . . . . . . • | 32a 1 
If you can be claimed as a dependent on another person's return, check here. . • 
If you are married filing a separate return and your spouse Itemizes deductions, 
or you are a dual-status alien, see page 15 and check here • . • 
32b 
32c 
Itemized deductions. See page 15 to see if you should itemize. If you don't itemize, enter zero. If 
you do itemize, attach Schedule A, enter the amount from Schedule A, line 26, AND skip line 33b . 
Standard deduction. Read Caution to left. If it applies, see page 16 for the amount to enter. 
If Caution doesn't f Single or Head of household, enter $2,540 1 
apply and your filing < Married filing jointly or Qualifying widow(er), enter $3,760 \ 
status from page 1 is: { Married filing separately, enter $1,880 J 
Subtract line 33a or 33b, whichever applies, from line 3 1 . Enter the result here 
Multiply $ 1,900 by the total number of exemptions claimed on line 6e or see chart on page 16 . . 
Taxable income. Subtract line 35 from line 34. Enter the result (but not less than zero) . . . . 
Caution: If under age 14 and you have more than $1,000 of investment income, check here i—l 
and see page 16 to see if you have to use Form 8615 to figure your tax. • | | 
37 
38 
39 
Enter tax. Check if from | |Tax Table, | | Tax Rate Schedules, 
Additional taxes (see page 16). Check if from 
a 
Form 4970 or 
Add lines 37 and 38. Enter the total 
Schedule D, or 
Form 4972 . 
I lForm8615 
31 
33a 
33b 
34 
35 
36 
m 37 
38 
39 
i o , i i i 
3,760, 
6,351 
7,600, 
0 , 
Credits 
<S*e 
Instructions 
on page 17.) 
Credit for child and dependent care expenses (attach Form 2441) 
Credit for the elderly or for the permanently and totally disabled 
dd lines 40 and 4 I.Enter the total 
Subtract line 42 from line 39. Enter the result (but not less than zero) 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116) 
45 General business credit. Check if from ( J Form 3800, | jForm 3468, 
LJForm5884, LjForm6478, | \fom 6765, or I JForm 8586 . . 
46 Add lines 44 and 45. Enter the total 
47 Subtract line 46 from line 43. Enter the result (but not less than zero) 
40 
41 
43 
44 
45 
47 
Other 
Taxes 
(^eluding 
Advance EIC 
Payments) 
48 Self -employment tax (attach Schedule SE) 
49 Alternative minimum tax (attach Form 6251) 
50 Tax from recapture of investment credit (attach Form 4255) 
51 Social security tax on tip income not reported to employer (attach Form 4137) 
52 Tax on an IRA or a qualified retirement plan (attach Form 5329) . . . . . 
48 
49 
50 
51 
53 Add lines 47 through 52. This is your total tax 53 
fijments 
Attach Forms 
W2.W-2G, 
•ndW-2P 
to front. 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Federal income tax withheld (including tax shown on Form(s) 1099) 
1987 estimated tax payments and amount applied from 1986 return 
Earned income credit (see page 18) . . 
Amount paid with Form 4868 (extension request) 
Excess social security tax and RRTA tax withheld (see page 19) 
Credit for Federal tax on gasoline and special fuels (attach Form 4136) 
Regulated investment company credit (attach Form 2439). . . 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
TTiw 
5 3 2 
TTJ 
61 Add lines 54 through 60. These are your total payments 1 , 8 4 4 . 
• 
• 
64 
62 If line 61 is larger than line 53, enter amount OVERPAID . . 
R e f u n d Or 63 Amount of line 62 to be REFUNDED TO Y O U . 
AntOUnt 64 Amount of line 62 to be applied to your 1988 estimated tax . . I 
YOU Owe 6 5 , f , i n e ^ 3 j s , a r 8 e r t n a n , m e 6 1« e n t e r AMOUNT YOU OWE. Attach check or money order for full 
amount payable to "Internal Revenue Service." Write your social security number, daytime phone 
number, and "1987 Form 1040" on it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Check • | | if Form 2210 (2210F) »s attached. See page 20. Penalty: $ 
62 1,B44. 
T7B44" 
Please 
Sign 
Here 
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, they are true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) Is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge. 
Your signature 
Spouse's signature (if joint return, BOTH must sign) 
Date 
Date 
Your occupation 
Spouse's occupation 
Paid 
Preparer's 
Use Only 
Preparer's 
signature • 
Date 
05-03-88 
Firm's name (or 
yours if self-employed) 
and address 
k COOK & COOK 
' 392 South Mnfn 
Check if 
self-employed • 
Preparer's social security no. 
529-68-0845 
E.I. No. 
ZIP code 
LOQCirfc Utah 8 4 3 9 1 fl"7_nOOiA J#% itU.S. Government Printing Offloa: 1987-205447 23-0f1f7S0 
P a r e n t a g e T e n t i n g L a b o r a t o r y 
U n i v e r s i t y o-f U t a h M e d i c a l C e n t e r 
S a l t Lake C i t , , U t a h 8 4 1 3 2 
( 3 0 1 ) 5 3 1 - 3 1 1 6 
PHENOTYPE 
MOTHER CHILD ALLEGED FATHER 
D M T E 
DPrtUff J 
PACE 
ABO 
HLA 
Rh 
MNSs. 
Kel 1 
k i d d 
D u -f -f y 
M A U G H A N 
JOSHUA 
PAUL 
14 JUNE 1933 
Al 
Al 
B8 B37 
MAUGHAM 
PAULETTE 
L. 
14 JUNE 1*83 
Cauca=ian 
Al 
Al All 
B22 B37 
MAUGHAM 
THOf IAS 
GUY 
13 JUNE 1988 
Csucsiian 
Al 
A2 A32 
B3 B27 
COMBINED PATERNITY INDEX 
FPOBABILITTr OF PATERNITY 
The putative -father, tested here, is excluded as the -father in 
a p 3 tern it,- index o-f zero because he does not possess an antigen ithich trust 
been tr sn^mi t ted to the child -from the biological -father or the child does 
possess an antigen which the tested man i/iould pass to his children. 
REPORT DATE: 21 JUNE 1'83 
f 1.T.: PMP 
<^.uX. 
C h a r l e s W. D e W i t t , P h . D , 
FT o-f . and D i r e c t o r 
TIM W. HEALY #1437 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
863 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP CACHE COUNTY STATE OP UTAH 
THOMAS G. MAUGHAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAULETTE LaDAWN NORMAN MAUGHAN 
Defendant. 
O^DER STAYING JUDGMENT 
Cjivil No. 21388 
The a b o v e e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t on 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion t o S t a y J u d g m e n t P e n d i n g A p p e a l w h i c h was 
f i l e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i th Rule 2 . 8 of t h e D i s t r i c t Court Rules of 
P r a c t i c e on t h e 22 d a y o f D e c e m b e r , 1 9 8 7 , a n d m a i l e d t o 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l on December 2 2 , 1987. P u r s u a n t t o s a i d Rule 
2 . 8 of t h e Ru les of P r a c t i c e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e f e n d a n t , 
t h r o u g h h e r c o u n s e l , had a p e r i o d of t e n d a y s t o respond t o 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Mot ion . Sa id p e r i o d of t ime h a v i n g e x p i r e d and no 
r e s p o n s i v e p l e a d i n g h a v i n g been f i l e d , 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED; 
1c That p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion t o S t a y Judgment Pending Appeal 
ORDER TO STAY JUDGMENT Page -2-
is granted. 
DATED this JJ_ day of JANUARY 1988. 
/s/ \l k»<V CfAM7?J?£*JtJ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order 
to Stay Judgment to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for Defendant, 
First Security Building, Logan, Utah 84312, on this ^ day of 
January, 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTICE & MAILING. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the Order Staying Judgment to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for 
Defendant by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail postage 
prepaid. Counsel for defendant is hereby notified that pursuant 
ORDER STAYING JUDGMENT Page -3-
to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice, counsel has five days to 
submit any objections to the Court. 
DATED this ff^ day of JANUARY, 1988. 
TIM W. HEALY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS G. MAUGHAN, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
PAULETTE LaDAWN NORMAN 
MAUGHAN, 
Defendant 
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment Pending 
Appeal• There having been no opposition having been filed 
thereto, the Motion is granted. 
Counsel for Plaintiff to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this jp day of January, 19 88* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 21388 
